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1. Introduction  
During the last decades the debate on working time regulation focused on how to achieve 
greater flexibility at workplace in a way that enhances company adaptability to the 
volatility of the product markets cycle. For many analysts this change in considering 
working time mainly as a tool for organizational flexibility was provoked by the multiple 
restructuring exercises, as well as the increasing interest of employers in controlling 
working hours that resulted, in turn, in numerous respective collective agreements and 
alternative working time arrangements at the company level. In many cases, these 
initiatives were followed by a considerable stagnation in collective working time 
reductions and were often associated with a support by the State in the sense that greater 
flexibility in working time schedules is a prerequisite for balancing working and family 
life and an instrument for economic success.  
In broad terms no serious changes have taken place in the volume of hours people 
work in Europe in the 1990s and forward. On the other side, unsocial hours of work have 
not increased to a great extent and the State still remains the basic architect of national 
working time regime. Nevertheless employer prerogative on working time determination 
has increased in many terms and it is more often nowadays to watch trade unions 
conceding in employers’ demands for extending working week and shopping hours. T 
Considering this situation, it is easy to get confused, as one the one hand no 
serious changes in national working time regimes are suggested and on the other hand it 
is argued that employers are more able nowadays to establish their terms and conditions 
in the bargaining agenda. Our starting point of analysis is that there are national paths and 
traits of working time changes in Europe. However, we suggest that behind the national 
variations and distinctiveness of each national case working time changes in Europe are 
definitely determined by employers’ strategies and their ad hoc needs. In other words, 
what determines the length and the organization of working hours has basically to do 
with current and update organizational needs rather than the regulatory framework and 
the possible militant reaction of trade unions in a proposed change. This provocative 
argument is tested taking as an example the case of the Greek labour market. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the working time 
trends in Greece; section 3 sets out the methodological framework; section 4 presents the 
results; finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
   
2. Working Time Trends in Greece 
Greece remains a really distinctive case regarding the trends of working time and the 
allocation of working hours across the workforce. At legislative level Greece is 
characterized by a remarkable stagnation on collective working time reductions. This 
stagnation is reinforced by the absence of specific collective agreements and negotiations. 
The final outcome of these forces (lack of legislative initiatives and collective agreements 
on working time) creates the space for a national working time regime characterized by a 
strong concentration of employees on the rule of five-day 40 hours working week and to 
a well established culture of long hours and extended shift patterns1. 
In practical terms this means that Greece has stopped to follow the international 
developments on working time by the early 1980s. The only similarity that can be found 
between Greece and the rest of the member countries that constitute the entity of 
European Union (EU) and specifically the EU-15 area could be embraced on the attempts 
of consecutive successive governments since 1990s to incorporate greater flexibility in 
the organization of working time schedules.  
Furthermore, this flexibility was never coincided with relevant efforts to reduce 
working hours as in the case of continental and north European countries where a model 
of consensual bargaining has evolved over the years in order to bridge the gap between 
unions and employers interests over the issue of working time (Zagelmeyer 2000, Natti 
1999). On the other hand, the way working time flexibility is sought and achieved by 
employers remains extremely traditional in the sense of extending working schedules by 
the widespread use of overtime shift pattern (Kretsos, 2004a). Agreements and 
regulations like that of VW in Germany or the 35 hours working week in France or the 6 
plus 6 shift scheme in Finland were either never found to a considerable extent or not 
even used at all to Greece2.  
Instead of that it is heavily evident by the results of national labour force surveys a 
marked stability in the usual hours of work. This stability is associated though with a 
strong desire by the state to promote labour market flexibility by lowering the demands 
for employer’s compliance to 40 hours – five days working week. Table 1 includes the 
                                                 
1 The last generalized collective reduction in working time took place in 1983 and was fully implemented 
for the total of economy in 1984. According to the National General Collective Agreement of 1983 the 
conventional weekly working hours was determined in 40 hours for employees in the private sector. Minor 
changes took place since then restricted mainly to certain exemptions to the rule like the working hours of 
public servants (37.5 hours), as well as the employees in the banking sector (38,20 hours) and other 
professional categories like personnel of insurance companies and the construction workers.  
2The analysis of Lehndorff (1995) is very indicative on this experimentation on working time organization. 
legislative initiatives by the State to deregulate working time rules in an effort to increase 
the margins of working time flexibility Greek companies can legally emulate.  
 
Table 1: 
Institutional changes in labour law  
regarding working time since the early of 1990s  
Lawς: Changes: 
1892/ 1990 • Regulatory framework for part-time employment 
• Introduction of 4th double 24 hours shift in the weekend  
• Flexible calculation of working hours for a three months period  
2639/ 1998 • Introduction of part-time employment in the public sector  
• Flexible calculation of working hours for a three/ four and six months  
      period  
2602/ 1998 • Unilateral managerial prerogative to introduce annualized hours scheme in Olymp
Airways SA  
2874/ 2000 • Introduction of annualized hours schemes if annual working hours  
      were reduced by 90 hours  
3174/ 2003 • Introduction of part-time employment in the public social services 
3250/ 2004 • Introduction of part-time employment in public sector and  
      the local government  
3385/ 2005 • Special regime for weekly working hours between 41-48 hours  
• Reduction of illegal overtime costs  
• New menu of choices for implementing annualized working hours systems 
3377/ 2005 • Extension of shopping hours  
                                                                Source: Kretsos (2006) 
 
This development marks a considerable difference between Greece and the rest of 
EU-15 countries. The introduction of working time flexibility was not first negotiated 
between the social partners but represents a merely pure legalistic approach by the 
government policy makers. This top-down approach was not successive at all, as, but has 
definitely altered the agenda on collective bargaining and labour regulation by excluding 
at all the issue of working time reduction. Even the typical “exchange of gifts” between 
employers and trade unions in the form of wage concessions and labour flexibility for any 
reduction in working time was not on the agenda. Employers usually welcome the above 
legislation but they insist on demanding greater flexibility in the labour market and 
heavily reject any proposal for reducing working time limits. Instead of that they suggest 
a more structural and liberal orientation policy under the framework of social dialogue. 
For example according to the opinion of the biggest employer body of Greece, the 
Confederation of Greek Industry (SEB) for the law 2874/ 2000 on the organization and 
the duration of working hours: 
- Overtime limitations and premiums are extremely high burdening in an 
excessive way Greek manufacturing. 
- The period of working time defined in an annual basis correspond just to 138 
hours per annum. This amount of hours is considered as not sufficient for the 
real flexibility of working time industry needs. 
- The implementation of an AH scheme rises dramatically the labour cost, as is 
implementation is associated with the reduction of the conventional working 
week from 40 to 38 hours (SEB, 2001). 
The above example is indicative of the negative stance the Confederation has taken to 
the past amendments of the regulatory framework. In essence it seems that employers 
need greater freedom in determining the quantity of overtime hours and its corresponding 
premium rate. In parallel to this, they ask for greater freedom in the way annualized hours 
can be developed giving greater scope to individual agreements between company and 
employees (Kouzis, 2002). 
These demands were partly satisfied with the last amendment on 2005. More 
specifically the respective legislation relaxed the rules and the cost for extending daily 
and weekly working hours as:  
• The premium cost of the 41 to 48 weekly working hours was reduced by 50% 
(from 50% to 25%). 
• The extension of weekly working time by 8 hours (from 41 to 48 hours) is not 
considered as an overtime period that needs to be registered and estimated to the 
overall overtime limits outstanding. Employers can use these hours at their own 
discretion and employees in practical terms can not deny providing them.  
• The cost of illegal overtime hours (those overtime hours exceed the maximum 
limits or are not registered and approved by the labour inspection services) is 
reduced from 150% to 100%.  
• Annualized hours schemes can be implemented at the workplace even if both 
parties do not come to a final agreement allowing the final decision to be taken by 
a special state authority. 
• Extra working hours and overtime worked during the application of an annualized 
hour scheme can be given back to employees in the form of time-off in lieu or in 
the form of an extended annual leave. 
             In that framework the State and employers could be considered as brothers in 
arms in avoiding make any drastic case to working time limits since 1983. As a result the 
issue of working time reduction remains for more than two decades a buried idea and a 
neglected policy area considered by the mainstream politicians and the employers as a 
trap for economic development and as an obstacle to the modernization process of the 
Greek economy3. Furthermore, the low wages and the slow growth in the net income of 
most employees push trade unions to focus mainly on wage demands and to a much 
lesser extent on working time issues. In other terms, limited improvements in real wages 
have blocked the trade union demands on the issue and have transferred to unions the 
stressful dilemma of exchanging the gains of increased productivity to rises in wages or 
reduction in working hours.   
Nevertheless, the effects of the respective legislative initiatives could be 
considered as more symbolic and to have little practical implications. For example, part-
time contracts in Greece still remain at extremely low level according to the EU accounts 
and temporary employment is no greater than the average EU. At the same time 
annualized hours schemes are not really evident in the Greek labour market and 
employers still stick on traditional forms of achieving working time flexibility, mainly in 
the form of extra overtime and extended shift schemes (Kretsos 2004a). In practice, the 
regulatory reforms were not at all inspiring to employers and nothing really changed after 
their enactment.  
This inconsistency between what the legislator proposes to social partners in 
scheduling work patterns can, to a great extent, be explained by the rather limited 
compliance of employers to working time legislation (Evans, Lippoldt and Marianna, 
2001).  
There are several indications that confirm this allegation. Namely: 
¾ The statistical service of IKA (Social Insurance Foundation), which is by far the 
largest social security organization in Greece, estimates that one in five 
employees has no social security coverage and is totally out of the regulatory 
system of work (www.ika.gr). 
¾ Relevant research by the Greek Federation of Social Policy Organisation Staff 
(POPOKP) estimates the level of social security contribution evasion at the 
                                                 
3 Several efforts by the unions to put forward the agenda on working time reduction, like that of the debate 
for 35 hours working week in 1997, were never successful and always not so important as the respective 
negotiations on wages. 
equivalent of 15%-20% of the total income of most social insurance funds, and 
30% in the case of the IKA. 
¾ The empirical findings of various investigative surveys of the phenomenon of 
undeclared work suggest that the proportion of the economy that is 'hidden' 
represents around 25%-40% of the official Gross Domestic Product (Kretsos, 
2004b). 
¾ Greece has the highest per capita level of illegal immigration in Europe (Martin 
Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). 
In accordance to these, the annual progress reports of SEPE (Corps of Labour 
Inspectors) constitute a more relevant resource to the issue of labour law violation in 
Greece. The respective reports indicate a pure inclination of many companies in certain 
sectors to bypass the established regulations. Furthermore, they document a dramatic 
increase on the requests to implement more overtime than the maximum legal limits. This 
evidence implies that a considerable number of companies are heavily dependent on 
extending daily shifts of work which in turn means two things:  
¾ Overtime represents a permanent feature in organizing work schedules and a basic 
formula to cover the unexpected demands of production. 
¾ The rule of the 40hours working week is inefficient and incompatible with the 
working time lengthening policies followed by many companies. 
 
Table 2: 
Overtime allowances for companies  
having used the maximum overtime hours set by legislation  
Year  Overtime 
allowances 
Workforce 
affected 
Total volume 
of hours 
Sunday 
work 
allowances
Workforce 
affected 
2000   7.818 312.134 5.040.521 6.863 112.086 
2001 21.799 469.163 15.440.254 8.334 117.422 
2002 29.616 515.744 18.866.465 9.798 139.478 
2003 26.838 637.447 20.130.172 8.426 122.173 
2004 22.137 369.538 18.720.874 8.272 134.514 
                                                                      Source: SEPE Annual Reports 2000-2004. 
 
 
The above points can be further explored and testified if we take into account the 
reality indicated by the descriptive statistics on working time in Greece. The most reliable 
source for this is the evidence drawn by the National Labour Force Surveys. According to 
this the developments in working time can be divided in two periods since the 
introduction of the 40hours working week in 1983: 
1. From 1983 to early 1990s usual hours of work were reduced to a considerable 
extent through the process of generalizing the 40hours rule. 
2. Since early 1990s working time increased again and stagnated on high levels for 
the EU-15 accounts. As a result the threshold of 40hours is not the case for a 
considerable (≈20%) part of the workforce. 
3. Excessive long hours (usually work more than 48 hours per week) remain 
constant at the levels of approximately 7% of the workforce during the whole 
period under review. 
Diagram 1 shows the way wage employment is allocated in the basis of usual weekly 
working hours between1983-2005. As it can be clearly seen from the contents of the table 
the most popular working time blocks are those that include work no less than 40 hours 
per week. This evolution suggests that working time schedules in Greece are 
characterized by a high volume of working hours. Counter to this, short-time work and 
part-time employment are relative rare and can be detected in limited number of services, 
namely education, private households with home-based personnel and real estate.  
Furthermore, if we try to detect relative developments on the way working hours are 
allocated, we realize a dynamic move to a long-hours regime and a subsequent decline of 
short-duration full-time employment. There are marked declines in the proportions 
working 25-39 and 41-48 hours per week in contrast to overtime and especially in 
contrast to the conventional full-time work (40 hours).  
More than 50% of wage employment is concentrated on the conventional time limits 
of 40 hours per week, while a significant proportion (around 15%) works between 37-40 
and 41-43 hours respectively. This practically means that more or less 65% of wage 
earners in Greece are employed on a usual basis at the level of the conventional working 
week limits. As such great homogeneity appears in the way working hours are distributed 
and scheduled across the workforce.  
 
 
 
Diagram 1: 
Allocation of wage employment  
in regards to usual hours of work per week, 1983-2005 
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In other words, the establishment of 40 hours working week in 1983 seems to 
have acted as a catalyst for the dispersion of the conventional full-time employment, as 
the proportion of those worked 40 per week stood at 32.7% in 1983 in contrast to 53.1% 
in 2005. That means that collective regulations in the early 1980s had a considerable 
impact on the duration of working hours. Nevertheless, the model of allocating working 
hours displays no other serious differences in the period under review. This stems from 
the absence of important regulations in the field of working time for the last two decades. 
The regulations of 1983 have been slacked so far and as a result there are serious 
concerns of a gradual extension of timetables. Consequently new regulations are needed 
in order to calm down the noiseless tendencies of a long hours working in the Greek 
labour market. 
For example, the extended timetables (more than 48 hours per week) display 
inelastic characteristics, as it is the only working time block in the diagram above that is 
not affected by the State regulations (Diagram 2). After twenty years and so, the 
proportion of people usually work more than 48 hours per week has marginally increased 
(6,3% in 1983 to 6,9% in 2002). Prolonged timetables are mainly detected in Agriculture, 
Transport, Storages and Communication, in Retail and Wholesale Trade and in Hotels 
and Restaurants. Nevertheless the most popular overtime pattern is 1 to 8 hours per week. 
Around 50% of overtime hours in Greece are related to a weekly work of 48 hours. After 
the generalized collective reduction in working hours in 1983, overtime employment 
emerged considerable downward trends for some years. Nevertheless, during 1990s 
overtime levels begun to rise again and to approach gradually the levels of 1983. 
Especially for the period of 1992-2005 overtime levels show a remarkable increase of 
24%. Furthermore, the non-cyclical nature of overtime in Greece indicates that it acts as a 
permanent source of achieving flexibility that is not linked with the cyclical fluctuations 
in GDP. 
Important, also, points can be drawn from the respective trends on unsocial hours 
of work and the shiftworking. The extension of such practices in international 
bibliography can be attributed to certain economic and technical factors. These could 
include for example the elimination of overtime associated costs, greater production 
capacity and faster depreciation of inventory stock and the facilitation of a continuous 
production process. Furthermore issues dealing with greater customer satisfaction like the 
extension of operating hours of public services, commercial stores and banking branches 
are also of great importance nowadays (Blyton, 1985).  
However, the most important reason for the extension of shiftwork practices is the 
greater utilization of productive equipment and inventory (Bosch, 1999). Employers are 
interested in this because certain stoppages and restarts of production facilities are 
associated with considerable costs. Shiftwork like overtime constitute forms of extending 
daily schedules in order to achieve greater organizational effectiveness. As we have 
shown overtime represents a basic characteristic of the way human resources are 
managed in Greece. The highly permanent and predictable pattern of overtime implies 
that shiftwork practices could be more cost effective.  
In that sense the legislator in Greece amplified the conditions under which these 
practices can be developed at the workplace. This regulation, firstly established in 1984 
at textiles industry after an arbitration award, coincides with the reduction of the 
conventional weekly working time limits. In other words in the early 1980s the State 
offered the carrot and the stick to collective actors. The employers were enforced to 
comply to a shorter working week (from 48 to 40 hours) and employees respectively 
were obliged to accept the development of shiftwork practices.  
However, since 1983 no serious attempt to change the institutional rules that 
govern working time is recorded and the State remains the basic architect of working 
time structures, as collective bargaining on the issue is still extremely weak. This 
situation results in a condition where shiftwork practices and unsocial hours of work 
indicate slight increase over the years and to some cases like that of Saturday work 
Greece exceeds by far the European average levels. The following tables are extremely 
supportive to this argument. 
Table 3: 
Shift working trends in Greece, 1992-2005 
 Sometimes Usually Total 
1992 3 7 10 
1993 3 8 11 
1994 3 7 10 
1995 3 8 10 
1996 3 9 12 
1997 4 8 11 
1998 3 8 12 
1999 7 13 20 
2000 6 13 20 
2001 6 13 19 
2002 5 13 19 
2003 6 14 20 
2004 5 14 19 
2005 5 13 19 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
Table 4: 
Evening work trends in Greece, 1992-2005 
 Sometimes Usually Total 
1992 23 17 40 
1993 26 16 42 
1994 27 15 42 
1995 29 14 44 
1996 32 14 47 
1997 31 14 46 
1998 32 15 47 
1999 33 15 47 
2000 33 13 46 
2001 33 14 47 
2002 31 14 45 
2003 33 15 48 
2004 32 13 45 
2005 31 15 46 
 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
 
 
Table 5: 
Nightwork trends in Greece, 1992-2005 
 Sometimes Usually Total 
1992 10 6 16 
1993 11 6 17 
1994 12 5 16 
1995 12 4 16 
1996 13 4 17 
1997 13 4 17 
1998 12 4 17 
1999 12 5 17 
2000 13 4 17 
2001 12 5 17 
2002 12 4 16 
2003 13 4 17 
2004 13 5 18 
2005 13 4 17 
 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: 
Saturday work trends in Greece, 1992-2005 
 Sometimes Usually Total 
1992 19 22 41 
1993 19 23 42 
1994 20 21 41 
1995 21 21 42 
1996 23 22 44 
1997 22 22 44 
1998 22 24 46 
1999 22 25 47 
2000 23 24 47 
2001 23 25 48 
2002 22 25 47 
2003 24 24 48 
2004 24 23 47 
2005 23 25 48 
 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
 
Table 7: 
Sunday work trends in Greece, 1992-2005 
 Sometimes Usually Total 
1992 14 8 22 
1993 15 8 23 
1994 15 7 23 
1995 16 7 23 
1996 17 7 24 
1997 17 7 23 
1998 17 7 24 
1999 16 8 24 
2000 17 7 24 
2001 16 7 24 
2002 16 8 24 
2003 17 7 24 
2004 18 7 25 
2005 17 7 24 
 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
 
To some extent the respective trends are fed by the gradual increase of working 
days per week since 1989. The following diagram reveals the percentage of employees 
that usually work more than five days per week. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: 
Employees who usually work more than 5 days per week, 1992-2005 
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                                                                           Source: National Labour Force Surveys 
 
The above developments (Diagram 3) in working time in Greece are also 
highlighted in several reports of international organizations like that of OECD and 
European Commission. For example, the following diagram (Diagram 4) from OECD 
Factbook 2007 reveals that Greece has one of the highest records in the world regarding 
the hours of work for the total of employment. More specifically the table is based on the 
total numbers of hours worked over the year divided by the average numbers of people in 
employment. Similarly, other resources like the EIRO annual review on working time 
developments and the Eurostat periodical publications on labour market trends indicate 
that Greeks can now be considered as the working hours - losers across EU-15 with only 
countries from the Eastern Europe to show comparable figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: 
Annual hours of work in the OECD countries, 2005 
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           Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2006 and OECD Factbook 2007 
 
3. Methodology  
The present paper is based on the initial results of an on-going project regarding the 
influential factors affecting working time and their impact on employment and 
productivity in Greece. So far we have discussed the main trends and drivers of working 
hours in Greece since 1983. The basic argument we made was that the obvious stagnation 
of collective working time reductions is the outcome of employer’s hostile strategies to 
reduce working hours and the partly supportive to this strategy orientation of public 
policy. We, in turn, support this argument by examining the economic basis that lies 
behind the debate of working hours in Greece over the last decades. Moreover, we test 
the hypothesis that the stagnation in working hours in Greece can not be explained by the 
respective trends on a series of important and relevant macroeconomic indicators like 
productivity and GDP growth.  
The respective trends of these macroeconomic indicators instead provide the basis 
for considerable reductions in working hours. However, the most recent serious collective 
and generalized working time reduction took place in 1983. As such and after the 
emulation of descriptive statistics drawn by the National Labour Force Surveys we follow 
next an index-de-composition analysis (IDA) at sectoral and national level, the details of 
which are described below. It should be noted that the basic advantage of an IDA is that it 
explains the percentage change of an indicator in accordance with the respective changes 
of other influential indicators.  
(a) Total Economy 
In that part of the research we investigate the change in hours per employee in relation to 
the respective changes in the total output, productivity and other demographic and labour 
market indicators. The inclusion of working hours in the model is applied through the 
productivity indicator and the indicator of hours of work per employee (see equation 1). 
However, the study of the long-term behaviour of working time indicators provides 
information regarding the effects of the respective changes of several economic, 
demographic and other variables.  
Finally, and in order to isolate the changes happened in employment and in the 
hours of work of wage employees we take up an additional variation of the model. 
Besides wage employment should be the main focus of analysis as only those employees 
will be affected by the public policy and the possible regulatory reforms in the future.  
 
Indices Methodology: Total Economy    
The analysis refers to the total economy over the time period 1993-2006. The basic 
relationship used is:    
GDP productivtiy working hours 
per      of per  
employeecapita labour
employment contribution
rate rate
                                                GDP GDP H L LF E
P H L LF E P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
=
( )age structure⎟⎠
 (1) 
The working time is introduced in the model through the productivity index (production / hours) 
and through the index of hours per employee (average employment per hour). Equation (2) that 
follows provides us with useful information about the (approximate) impact on the GDP (per 
capita) of a change in economic, demographic and other relative factors.  
 
In essence we use the following relationship:   
  + + +GDP GDP H L LF ELn Ln Ln Ln Ln Ln
P H L LF E P
Δ = Δ Δ Δ + Δ Δ   (2) 
Through equation (2) we may calculateΔ HLn
L
. 
Finally, we make a simple transformation to the model so that the changes  
in employment and working hours of the wage earners are made clear. So:   
H LH H
L H L L
μ μ
μ μ
=         (3) 
Where:  
Ημ the working time of the wage earners  
Lμ the number of wage earners  
Consequently, the model takes the following  final form:  
H LGDP GDP H L LF E
P H H L L LF E P
μ μ
μ μ
=      (4) 
 
 (b) Sectoral Level 
The methodology that is applied at national level can also be applied with certain 
modifications at sectoral level. In that case, the demographic characteristics (population, 
age structure) are not so interesting and influential. Instead, the most decisive factors are 
all the characteristics that are related to the distinctiveness of the sectors structure in the 
economy. Looking at the application of the relevant relationships between these factors 
and the total economy we come to the conclusion that working time is influenced in a 
different way at each sector of economic activity. As such every sector evolves different 
patterns of change and response to the interrelation of the investigated variables.  
In this study, we test this on a pilot basis to four different sectors of economic 
activity. Namely these sectors are: 1) Food, beverages and tobacco industry, (2) Non-
metallic mineral products (3) Construction and (4) Hotels & Restaurants. In that case the 
changes of working hours are examined for the full-time employees in the private sector. 
The respective analysis relates to the period of 1995-2005 and the choice of the above 
sectors was based on the contribution of each sector in the total output (product) of the 
economy, as well as in the number of full-time employees that are recorded in them.   
 
 
Indices Methodology: Sectoral Level   
The methodological framework presented earlier is relevant however; we are mainly interested in 
the sector’s structure with respect to the total economy.  
Consequently: 
 i i i
i i i
X X X L H H
L X L H H L
=  (5) 
where:  
Xi  product of sector i 
X  product of the total economy  
Li employment of sector i  
L employment in the total economy 
Hi working time (hours) of sector i  
Η working time (hours) in the total economy  
So:  
i ii i
i i i
H LH H
L H L L
μ μ
μ μ
= ,    (6) 
Where:  
Liμ the number of full wage earners in the private part of sector i and  
Hiμ the working time of full time wage earners in the private part of sector i 
Consequently: 
i ii i i
i i i i
H LX X X L H H
L X L H H H L L
μ μ
μ μ
=   (7) 
 
 
4. Results  
a) National Level 
On the basis of the three approaches we used in this analysis (total employment/ full-time 
employees/ full-time employees in the private sector) the results could be more 
systematic in relation to working time at the level of national economy. For that reason 
we calculate the growth rates of the indicators that explain the changes on working time 
in Greece for the period of 1993-2006. Accordingly, we found that : 
¾ In the first case (Total Employment) the total average weekly working time was 
reduced on the period under review by 0.18% (Table 7).  
 
Table 7:  
National Level (growth rates)  
H/L GDP/P GDP/H L/LF LF/E E/P 
-0,18 3,49 2,76 -0,07 0,87 0,11 
 
From Table 7 we draw the conclusion that the total change in working time is mainly 
explained by the respective changes in GDP per capita (+3.49%) and the rise in the 
labour productivity levels (+2,76%). The rest indicators influence the changes in working 
time per employee (H/L) only to a minor extent.  
 
¾ Similarly in the second case (full-time employees) we found out that the marginal 
decrease of working time is heavily explained and attributed to the respective 
changes in GDP per capita (+3.49%) and the rise in the labour productivity levels 
(+2,73%). In parallel to this the indicators of H/Hm and Lm/L do not affect to a 
significant level the changes of Him/Lim (Table 8).  
    
Table 8:  
National Level (growth rates) 
Hm/Lm GDP/P GDP/H H/Hm Lm/L L/LF LF/E E/P 
-0,01 3,49 2,73 -1,79 1,65 -0,07 0,86 0,11 
 
¾ Finally in the third case (full-time employees in the private sector) it is obvious 
that the marginal decrease of Him/Lim can also be attributed to the behaviour of 
the GDP per capita (+3.49%) and the labour productivity (+2.71%) (Table 9). 
 
Table 9:  
National Level (growth rates) 
Him/Lim GDP/P GDP/H H/Him Lim/L L/LF LF/E E/P 
0,07 3,49 2,71 -2,56 2,37 -0,06 0,85 0,11 
 
Consequently, and according to the previous analysis, the GDP per capita and the 
labour productivity are the main decisive factors that affect more the marginal decrease 
of working time in the Greek economy in the examined period (1993-2006). 
b) Sectoral Level 
At the level of the examined sectors during 1995-2005 we initially realize that working 
time shows a marginal increase, except for the case of Hotels & Restaurants, in which 
working time increases. The factors that explain these developments differ from sector to 
sector as it is clearly shown in the following table (Table 10).  
 
Table 10:  
Sectoral Level (Growth rates) 
 
Nevertheless, for all sectors the indicators of the sector’s productivity (Xi/Li), as 
well as the share of the sector in the total economy output (Xi/X) and the total labour 
productivity in the economy (X/L) are the most decisive in determining the final changes 
in working time. In other words the labour productivity at sectoral and the total economy 
level, as well as the GDP growth of each sector remain the most important variables in 
attributing the respective changes in working time. Consequently, in all levels of analysis 
we observe that GDP per capita and labour productivity determine almost entirely the 
changes in working time in Greece.  
 
Conclusions  
From the analysis regarding the trends of working hours in Greece, we can easily see that 
in the last decades a stagnation effect in collective working time reductions is observed. 
This condition is heavily influenced by the employer’s strategies to extend daily and 
weekly working hours according to the ad hoc needs and demands of production. The 
State supports these strategies by incorporating to the national labour law regulations that 
aim to enhance work flexibility and by avoiding taking a stance on the issue of working 
  
Manufacture of food 
products; beverages 
and tobacco 
Manufacture 
of other 
non-metallic 
mineral 
products 
Constructions Hotels and Restaurants
Him/Lim 0,134 0,326 0,544 -0,178 
Xi/Li 2,238 6,313 4,047 3,796 
Xi/X -1,794 3,510 3,849 1,846 
X/L 2,632 3,279 2,718 1,880 
L/H -0,035 -0,043 -0,036 -0,025 
H/Hi 1,531 0,365 -3,065 -0,684 
Him/Lim 0,134 0,326 0,544 -0,178 
Lim/Li 2,763 0,449 1,668 2,560 
time reduction. However, despite the consecutive since the 1990s legislative efforts to 
disperse flexible forms of work and flexible working time arrangements no serious 
changes in working hours are observed. 
Employers still manage to achieve greater flexibility by the traditional forms of 
overtime and extended shiftwork patterns and extremely limited cases of negotiated 
flexibility are to be found in the Greek labour market (flexibility agreements at the 
workplace, annualized hours schemes, etc.). This is often associated with the bypass and 
the violation of existing regulations on working time limits. The fact that the percentage 
of employees that usually work more than the conventional working hours (40 hours per 
week) remains almost unchanged for a considerable period as that of more than two 
decades speaks volumes. 
Furthermore, the main contrary argument of employers and partly of the State to 
any attempt of reducing working hours is that such reduction will prove extremely 
harmful to the economy and its modernization process in the era of the volatile markets 
and the turbo-intensified competition. However, from the Index De-composition Analysis 
it was found that the marginal working hours’ changes do not have a real economic base. 
Essentially, the evidence suggested that the developments in GDP per capita and in 
labour productivity determine almost exclusively the trends in working time in Greece.  
From this angle two main topics for further research can be drawn: 
The stagnation in actual hours of work and the impressive results in the filed of GDP 
per capita and labour productivity growth is a combination that leads us with 
mathematical accuracy to two explanatory points. Either the companies have established 
a process of modernization with the inclusion of more effective, new technologies or they 
have followed work intensification policies. To that extent, the sectoral analysis can shed 
greater light on this, as important differences in working hours between different sectors 
of economic activity can be found. Besides, the present evidence suggests that the burden 
of excessive long hours is focused on certain activities and in the private sector of the 
economy. 
Both GDP per capita and labour productivity have shown a remarkable increase over 
the years which in practical terms are a suitable condition for reducing working hours. 
Actually, it is an appropriate condition for trade unions to put forward their demands on 
working time as historically working time reductions always happened when there was an 
increase in GDP and labour productivity. However, unions in Greece have put the issue 
of working time in a second place in relation to wage demands. As such, a respective 
analysis on the trends in real wages in accordance with the retail price index would be 
more than crucial in those terms. If employees have been compensated for the observed 
economic growth in terms of wage increase then the stagnation in working time can be 
considered as a rational choice by the unions. If however the rise on real wages lags 
behind those in GDP per capita and labour productivity then there is a serious issue of 
unequal distribution of income and of rising wage inequality. Employees were not 
compensated for the increased wealth of the economy either in the form of higher wages 
or in the form of less working hours. 
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